Zombies Slap Back: Why the Anti-Zombie Parody Does Not Work
In his “anti-zombie argument”, Keith Frankish turns the tables on “zombists”, forcing them to find an independent argument against the conceivability of anti-zombies. I argue that zombists can shoulder the burden, for there is an important asymmetry between the conceivability of zombies and the conc...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2015
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=5111888 |
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| Summary: | In his “anti-zombie argument”, Keith Frankish turns the tables on
“zombists”, forcing them to find an independent argument against the
conceivability of anti-zombies. I argue that zombists can shoulder the
burden, for there is an important asymmetry between the conceivability
of zombies and the conceivability of anti-zombies, which is reflected
in the embedding of a totality-clause under the conceivability operator.
This makes the anti-zombie argument susceptible to what I call the
‘Modified Incompleteness’, according to which we cannot conceive of
scenarios. In this paper I also argue that conceiving of the zombiesituation
is a good starting point for rendering the zombie argument
plausible. |
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