Opacity, Know-How States, and their Content
The main goal of this paper is to defend the thesis that the content of know-how states is an accuracy assessable type of nonconceptual content. My argument proceeds in two stages. I argue, first, that the intellectualist distinction between types of ways of grasping the same kind of content is unin...
Guardado en:
| Autor principal: | |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | inglés |
| Publicado: |
2015
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=5111890 |
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| Sumario: | The main goal of this paper is to defend the thesis that the content
of know-how states is an accuracy assessable type of nonconceptual
content. My argument proceeds in two stages. I argue, first, that the
intellectualist distinction between types of ways of grasping the same
kind of content is uninformative unless it is tied in with a distinction
between kinds of contents. Second, I consider and reject the objection
that, if the content of know-how states is non-conceptual, it will be
mysterious why attributions of knowing how create opaque contexts. I
show that the objection conflates two distinct issues: the nature of the
content of know-how states and the semantic evaluability of know-how
ascriptions. |
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