Más dependiente y menos competente: el nuevo senado belga de comunidades y regiones tras la reforma constitucional
The Belgian Senate has only not been alien to the transformations of Belgian federalism, but in each of the constitutional revisions that have taken place since 1831, its composition has always been subject to change. So, in the midst of a political and institutional crisis following the federal ele...
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| Formato: | Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | español |
| Publicado: |
2016
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| Acceso en línea: | https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=5865517 |
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| Sumario: | The Belgian Senate has only not been alien to the transformations of Belgian federalism, but in each of the constitutional revisions that have taken place since 1831, its composition has always been subject to change. So, in the midst of a political and institutional crisis following the federal elections of 2010, the post-election government formation and agreements forged institutional Agreement to the Sixth state reform of October 11, 2011, which has involved a constitutional revision and a broad legislative implementation that has affected many aspects of the territorial and institutional organization. The aim of this reform of the Senate, according to the preamble of the reform, is to ensure the participation of the parliaments of the federated entities (regions and linguistic communities) to the organization and functioning of the federal state and create a real linkage for Community and Regional Parliaments. One of the most important changes of this Senate reform is given by the abolition of the direct election of senators. On the other hand, by excluding the Senate legislative procedure on matters other than those expressly mentioned in arts. 77 and 78 of Belgian Constitution, the reform has created a residual legislative power for the House of Representatives, making unicameralism the general rule and bicameralism the exception. Senate resulting from this reform represents a break with the Senate that is left behind. Even so, the resulting Senate is not comparable to any known federal model. Nevertheless, the weakest aspect of this reform is that usual to reforms of second chambers, which is to fail to territorialize the vote of the senators, because in so far as the vote continues to have a political affiliation, the territory that they represent is not thinkable as a subject represented. |
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