John Locke: los racionales, las bestias y la resistencia
In the Two Treatises on Civil Government, Locke distinguishes associations from political societies. Only in political societies exist a common law, a judiciary to appeal to with authority to decide between disputes, and enough collective power to punish offenders. In making this distinction, Locke...
Guardado en:
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | español |
| Publicado: |
2021
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=7970482 |
| Etiquetas: |
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!
|
| Sumario: | In the Two Treatises on Civil Government, Locke distinguishes associations from political societies. Only in political societies exist a common law, a judiciary to appeal to with authority to decide between disputes, and enough collective power to punish offenders. In making this distinction, Locke seems to assert that political society subsists as long as natural conflicts cease, but also, and not least, that there are no true political ties until such disputes cease. In other words, the Lockean political field appears emptied of conflict. In this "emptying", Locke resorts to various figures (the thief, the animal, the raving mad-man, the heady malcontent, the tyrant) to depoliticize the remaining or subsequent conflicts about common norms. In all of them lies the identification of the rational with the political and with the human. The article proposes an analysis of these figures to show that Locke calls "resistance" or "rebellion" to the expression of the hegemonic crisis in which these identifications of the human with the rational and the rational with the political become destabilized. |
|---|