The ‘mi̇cro’ is not enough: Some plurali̇sti̇c responses to mi̇crophysi̇cal reducti̇oni̇sm

As the basis for metaphysical explanations, microphysical properties are generally defined as fundamental properties. In this context, we rarely doubt that the microphysical properties used to determine resemblance among objects or to distinguish them from others operate at a different level than ma...

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Autor principal: Akalin, Atilla
Formato: Artículo
Lenguaje:inglés
Publicado: 2025
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Acceso en línea:https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=10451898
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