La persona como 'dispositivo' y la primacía de lo impersonal
The article analyzes Roberto Esposito's thesis that the person is an immunological device conceived to protect human life, but which at the same time restricts it. Although apparently conceived to safeguard the rights of every human being, its very structure makes this impossible, since it contains...
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| Formato: | Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | español |
| Publicado: |
2025
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=10453777 |
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| Sumario: | The article analyzes Roberto Esposito's thesis that the person is an immunological device conceived to protect human life, but which at the same time restricts it. Although apparently conceived to safeguard the rights of every human being, its very structure makes this impossible, since it contains an element of exclusion and domination. The notion of personhood would be inseparable from a transcendent and possibly violent conception, so that instead of basing itself on rationality or on the affirmation of the “I” or the “you,” characteristic of personalism, rights and dignity would have to be sustained in the individualization proper to impersonal life or a “third person.” Nor would plurality be possible if each person were unique, because in that case it would not be possible to affirm others. The contribution will try to clarify the scope of a primacy of the impersonal and, at the same time, to question the possibility of renouncing the personal. |
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