Pareto Optimality and Equilibria in Noncooperative Games

This chapter considers the Nash equilibrium strategy profiles that are Pareto optimal with respect to the rest of the Nash equilibrium strategy profiles. The sufficient conditions for the existence of such pure strategy profiles are established. These conditions employ the Germeier convolutions of t...

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Autores principales: Zhukovskiy, Vladislav, Kudryavtsev, Konstantin
Formato: Capítulo de libro
Lenguaje:inglés
Publicado: IntechOpen 2020
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Acceso en línea:https://www.intechopen.com/chapters/68246
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Sumario:This chapter considers the Nash equilibrium strategy profiles that are Pareto optimal with respect to the rest of the Nash equilibrium strategy profiles. The sufficient conditions for the existence of such pure strategy profiles are established. These conditions employ the Germeier convolutions of the payoff functions. For the noncooperative games with compact strategy sets and continuous payoff functions, the existence of the Pareto-optimal Nash equilibria (PoNE) in mixed strategies is proven.
ISBN:978-1-78984-718-5
DOI:10.5772/intechopen.88184